A number of experimental newsvendor studies have shown that human subjects make decisions which coincide with a "pull-to-center" effect. In general, three behavioral theories have been proposed in the literature to explain this behavior: bounded rationality, mean anchoring, and minimizing ex post inventory regret. Unfortunately, these models generate similar predictions under symmetric demand distributions commonly used in newsvendor experiments, such as uniform or normal, and have thus remained as three equally plausible models for newsvendor decisions. In this study, we employ a simple experimental design with asymmetric demand distribution, which allows us to directly tease out these three explanations. Our results suggest that bounded rationality is useful in explaining variability in decisions, but it is inconsistent with average choices. We follow this by incorporating the mean anchoring and ex post inventory regret biases into the bounded rationality model, and find that the mean anchoring bias model cannot account for decisions. However, we do observe that the ex post inventory regret bias, when incorporated with bounded rationality, can consistently explain newsvendor decisions.
Introduction
Managers often face operational decisions involving uncertain demand scenarios. For example, a fashion buyer must forecast whether a particular product will be a hit or not in the upcoming season, and determine how much to order from their supplier (Fisher and Raman 1996, Eppen and Iyer 1997) . Similarly, to meet future market growth, a plant manager must project different demand scenarios, and decide how much to invest in production capacity (Van Mieghem 1998) . A common modeling framework for addressing these problems is the newsvendor model. The optimal solution to the newsvendor problem, which maximizes the expected profit payoff, is frequently referred to as the "critical fractile" point of the demand distribution. However, experimental studies show that human decision makers tend to deviate from the optimal solution in the newsvendor problem from period to period, and that they exhibit a "pull-to-center" effect, stocking quantities somewhere between the critical fractile prediction and mean of demand. These deviations appear to be driven not only by random errors, but decision biases as well (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) .
There exist three equally plausible theories to account for the newsvendor decision behavior in the literature: bounded rationality, mean anchoring, and minimizing ex post inventory regret (Su 2008, Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) . The first model captures random errors in decisions, whereas the last two model newsvendor context-specific biases. Despite the plethora of studies focusing on newsvendor experiments, no work has successfully allowed one to directly compare these three competing theories. Instead, all three models have remained as plausible models that can predict newsvendor decisions. Understanding which biases are at play is important so that one can begin to determine how to mitigate any sub-optimal behavior. In this paper, we present experimental studies that allows one to separate and compare the three most common newsvendor explanations.
Under the bounded rationality model framework, human decision makers are assumed to be boundedly-rational, such that their decisions are subject to random errors, caused by cognitive and computational limitations (the "trembling hand" effect). However, their decision choices still follow a logit model with a theoretically appealing property-"better options are chosen more often" (Su 2008, p. 569) . In the first study of this paper, we conduct a simple newsvendor experiment to understand how well bounded rationality captures decisions, and find a paradoxical observationpeople reveal their preferences for one option based on the expected profit, but actually choose the other in the newsvendor problem. In other words, better options are not chosen more often in our newsvendor experiment. This inconsistency suggests that random errors alone cannot account for newsvendor decisions; one must include newsvendor context-specific biases into the model. Among the models for newsvendor context-specific biases, mean anchoring and minimizing ex post inventory regret are the two most compelling ones, both receiving considerable support in past studies (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Bolton and Katok 2008) . 1 However, in our second study we find that, incorporating the mean anchoring bias into the bounded rationality model cannot account for newsvendor decisions. On the other hand, incorporating the ex post inventory regret bias (with an underweighting of leftover inventory) can consistently explain all newsvendor decisions. The underweighting of leftover inventory effect in our experiment is also consistent with the data in the previous studies by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) and Bolton and Katok (2008) .
Unlike past newsvendor studies, our experiment is unique in featuring a simple two-point asymmetric demand distribution (as opposed to uniform or normal demand). Demand is either high or low, with an uneven probability distribution. In our first study, we allow for two inventory decision options, which are the same as the two demand points. We set the newsvendor cost parameters in such a way that the optimal decision is to stock at the low-probability demand point, where the bounded rationality model predicts that the low-probability demand quantity be chosen more often than the high-probability demand quantity. However, in our experiment we find the opposite, suggesting that random errors alone cannot account for the decision behavior.
In our second study, we use the same cost and demand parameters, but include an additional decision option at the mean of demand. In this design, the mean anchoring model predicts that subjects should choose the mean more often than the (suboptimal) high-probability demand point.
However, again, we find the opposite in our experiment, suggesting that the mean anchoring bias cannot account for the decision behavior and only the ex post inventory regret bias can consistently explain the experimental observations. In summary, while all three models can explain newsvendor decisions in past studies with symmetric demand distributions, we find that only the bounded rationality model that incorporates the ex post inventory regret bias is robust and flexible enough to account for newsvendor decisions under asymmetric demand distributions. In addition, we find that the decision behaviors predicted by the three models all exist at the individual level, where a dominant majority can be explained by the ex post inventory regret bias and the bounded rationality model. Thus, the aggregate level model fit is essentially driven by the relative proportion of decision behavior at the individual level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present a brief summary of the relevant literature in §2. In §3 we provide the details of our first study, which determines whether bounded rationality can account for newsvendor decisions, or whether other biases are at play in the newsvendor setting. This section will provide details on the bounded rationality model, our experimental design, results, and a discussion. In §4, we will present the second study, which extends the first by investigating the most common theories associated with newsvendor decisions. Specifically, in this section, we will combine bounded rationality with the mean anchoring bias and the ex post inventory regret bias, present the results of an experiment that can tease out these competing explanations, and provide a discussion. §5 contains our final summary.
Literature Review
Research in behavioral operations management has uncovered various effects that influence human decisions involving operational problems. These include, but are not limited to, the bullwhip effect in supply chains (Croson and Donohue 2006) , capacity scheduling (Olivares, Terwiesch and Cassorla 2008) , social preferences (Loch and Wu 2008) , forecasting (Özer, Zheng and Chen 2011), contracting Ho 2007, Kalkanci, Chen and Erhun 2011) , mental accounting (Chen, Kok and Tong 2013) , and procurement (Davis, Katok and Kwasnica 2013) .
One operational topic that has received considerable interest from a behavioral standpoint is the newsvendor problem. The seminal experimental paper on this topic is Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) . In their work, they identify that decision makers set quantities in a way that systematically deviates from the normative theory. In particular, they notice a "pull-to-center" effect, where subjects set a quantity somewhere between the mean of the demand distribution and normative prediction. Since the work of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) , a number of studies have illustrated the robustness of the pull-to-center result. In particular, these studies have shown the newsvendor pull-to-center effect persists in settings with additional decisions, more feedback relating to foregone options, higher payoffs, lower decision frequency, multilocation correlation (Bolton and Katok 2008 , Bostian, Holt and Smith 2008 , Lurie and Swaminathan 2009 , Ho, Lim and Cui 2010 , and experienced managers (Bolton, Ockenfels and Thonemann 2012) .
To account for this pull-to-center behavior, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) posit two explanations: mean anchoring and minimizing ex post inventory regret. However, their experiment does not allow them to determine which is the primary cause of the pull-to-center effect, leaving both as plausible explanations. Another accepted explanation for newsvendor decisions is the bounded rationality model (Su 2008) . It states that decision makers prefer better options, but that they do not make the correct choice 100% of the time. This model differs from the explanations of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) in that it focuses on subjects making errors, rather than incorporating non-pecuniary payoffs into a decision maker's expected-utility function.
Bounded rationality is largely based on a model developed in the experimental economics literature. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) propose such a model for normal form games (termed the "quantal response equilibrium") and apply it to various experimental game data. Successful applications of the model have been reported in coordination games (Anderson, Goeree and Holt 2001) , auction games (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey 2002) , pricing contracts Ho 2007, Ho and Zhang 2008) , newsvendor experiments (Su 2008) , and capacity allocation games (Chen, Su and Zhao 2012) .
In regards to more recent work on the newsvendor, Lee and Siemsen (2013) find that separating ordering decisions into forecasts, uncertainty estimates, and service level choices results in improved newsvendor decisions. Moritz, Hill and Donohue (2013) identify a strong correlation between newsvendor behavior and cognitive reflection. Ockenfels and Selten (2013) propose an "impulse balancing" model for newsvendor decisions. Ren and Croson (2013) conduct a newsvendor experiment with normally distributed demand, and find that underestimating the variance of demand causes orders to deviate in certain ways.
The most closely related work to ours is Kremer, Minner and Wassenhove (2010) . They too include lottery choice questions in a newsvendor experiment, and show that newsvendor contextsensitive biases exist. However, our first study differs from theirs in 1) presenting subjects with binary choice lotteries versus seven-choice lotteries, thereby allowing us to easily measure subjects' utility preferences, 2) examining lotteries within-subject versus between-subject, which permits one to see if subjects make different decisions between the two contexts, and 3) employing an asymmetric demand distribution. Furthermore, our second study is unique to theirs in focusing on the most common newsvendor explanations, mean anchoring, minimizing ex post inventory regret, and bounded rationality. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first in the literature to allow a comparison of these three plausible theories.
Study 1: Validating the Bounded Rationality Model
In this section, we present the results of our Study 1. In this study, we investigate whether random errors, or bounded rationality, can fully explain the newsvendor decision behavior. We begin by presenting the theory for bounded rationality, followed by the details of the experimental design and results. The unit purchase cost for the product is c and the unit selling price is p, with 0 < c < p. The unit salvage value for any leftover inventory is assumed to be zero. With the two-point demand, the expected profit-maximizing order quantity q * is either d or d , depending on which option gives a higher expected profit payoff. Specifically, the expected profit for each order quantity is given by
Thus, q * = d if π > (p − c)/p, and q * = d otherwise. The ratio (p − c)/p is commonly referred as the critical fractile in the newsvendor problem.
Su (2008) proposes a bounded rationality model to account for the random errors in human decisions observed in newsvendor experiments. Specifically, based on the expected profit function given in (1), the "noisy" utility function can be written as
where β (β > 0) measures the extent of bounded rationality of the decision maker, and ε and ε are independent standard Gumbel random variables. If β → 0, the decision maker has perfectly rational decisions, whereas if β → ∞, the decision maker randomizes between the two choices.
Under this model, it turns out that the choice probability for q = d is given by
The choice probability for q = d is simply 1 − P (q = d). From the above expression, it follows that q = d is chosen more frequently than q = d if and only if π > (p − c)/p. Below we shall refer to this model as the "bounded rationality model."
It is worth noting that the Gumbel noise assumption is not essential in the above model prediction. The same prediction can be obtained from the normal noise assumption. To see this, suppose that ε and ε are independent standard normal random variables. Then ε − ε follows a normal distribution with N (0, √ 2), and we have
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. From the above expression,
we have P (q = d) > 1/2 if and only if π > (p − c)/p, which is identical to what is implied in (3).
Thus, the above prediction is robust to different noise assumptions under the two-point demand.
Experimental Design
In our experiment each participant played the role of a manager facing uncertain demand, whose task was to decide how many units of inventory to stock for a single demand realization. In each of 30 rounds, demand was either 100 or 400, independent and identically distributed each round, and participants were given the option of ordering either 100 or 400 units. Note that the demand mean was not a feasible decision choice in the design, differentiating our experiment from past newsvendor experimental studies (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Kremer et al. 2010 ).
In our experiment the selling price was fixed at p = 4 per unit, the cost per unit was fixed at c = 1, and the P (D = 100) = 0.70. We chose a sample size of 30 to match the number of rounds played by each participant, thus allowing the statistical power to be comparable between any analysis at the aggregate level, where a single subject constitutes an independent observation (n = 30), and individual level, where each round is an observation (n = 30). Also, with a sample size of 30, the underlying binomial distribution can be well approximated by a normal distribution. Given these parameters, the bounded rationality model yields a probabilistic prediction, P (q = 100) < 1/2 (see §3.1). In Table 1 , we display the actual profits for each demand realization, the expected profits, and the bounded rationality prediction. Decision options Demand scenario q = 100 q = 400 D = 100 300 0 (×0.70) D = 400 300 1200 (×0.30) Expected profit 300 360 Bounded rationality prediction (probability) < 1/2 > 1/2
After participants completed the newsvendor experiment, all 30 rounds, they were presented with two sequential lottery choice questions that explicitly displayed the same random profit payoffs as in the newsvendor problem (outlined in Table 1 ). For this task subjects chose between (A) a 100% chance of 300 profit, and (B) a 70% chance of 0 profit and a 30% chance of 1200 profit. In the first of the two lottery questions, the decision was played as a single-play lottery, emulating a one-round newsvendor problem. For the second question, the decision was played as a repeated 30-play lottery, i.e., after the participant made their choice, the lottery was automatically played 30 independent times and the earnings were summed up, emulating a 30-round newsvendor problem. 2
Participants were paid based on the results of both lottery choice questions, to ensure that the monetary incentive was the same as in the newsvendor task. The purpose of these lottery choice questions was to elicit subjects' utility preferences for the relevant payoffs, and see whether any potential biases are specific to the newsvendor context. 3
We conducted Study 1 in the spring of 2013 at a northeast U.S. university. Participants were mostly undergraduate students. At the start of the session, each participant was given about five minutes to read the instructions, which included a summary of the game and how their profits would be calculated. Following this, we read the instructions aloud and answered any questions (instructions available upon request). Participants were recruited through an online system where cash was the only incentive offered. Average compensation was around $22, with a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $40. Each session lasted approximately 40 minutes and utilized the zTree system for software implementation (Fischbacher 2007 ).
Results
We begin by presenting summary statistics, using the frequency that a subject orders a quantity of 100, P (q = 100), as our primary metric of interest, and its equivalent decision in the lottery questions. Figure 1 plots the round by round decisions for how often a quantity of 100 was selected as well as the bounded rationality prediction (grey area), and normative benchmark. We do not find evidence of learning effects, as a Pearson's chi-squared test to check the independence of decisions across 30 rounds provides no significant effect of rounds (χ 2 (29) = 28.52, p = 0.490). Table 2 shows the probability that q = 100 was selected in the newsvendor rounds and lottery questions, where standard errors are calculated across subjects and presented in the brackets. When we compare the newsvendor and lottery data to each other, we observe a paradox. Comparing the first-round newsvendor data and the single-play lottery data, a one-sided proportions test reveals a significant difference (p = 0.035). Between the 30-round average newsvendor data and the repeatedplay lottery data, a one-sided proportions test also reveals relative significance (p = 0.067). This discrepancy suggests that there exists a newsvendor specific bias compared to the the profit-based utility preferences. From the choice probability of P (q = 100) given in (3), we can derive a maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE) of the bounded rationality measure β (see the Appendix for the detailed derivation).
Recall that β > 0 is required under the bounded rationality model assumption. Thus, based on the sign of the β estimate, we can determine the goodness of fit of the bounded rationality model. Table 3 shows the estimation results based on the aggregate-level data, where standard errors are presented in the brackets. We observe that the sign of the bounded rationality parameter β from the newsvendor data is incorrect and significant, but the signs of β from the lottery question data are both correct.
We also explore how the bounded rationality model fits our data when allowing for heterogeneity. Based on the expected-profit utility, we calculate that 67% of subjects' choice probabilities do not conform to the bounded rationality model prediction, i.e. 67% set P (q = 100) < 1/2. Moreover, 50% of subjects' choice probabilities reject the prediction based on a more stringent, two-sided proportions test with a 5% level of significance. Figure 2 illustrates a histogram of the choice probabilities, P (q = 100), at the subject level, where the grey range represents the bounded rationality prediction. In Figure 2 , one may note that there is somewhat of a mode in the range of 0.55-0.85, which roughly coincides with the probability of demand equalling 100, P (D = 100) = 0.70. This resembles probability matching behavior (Vulkan 2000) , where a common strategy is "win-stay-lose-shift."
To evaluate the win-stay-lose-shift effect, we define a "win" as a match between the order decision and the realized demand, and "lose" as a mismatch between the two. Conditional on an event of win or lose, we evaluate whether there is a change in a subject's subsequent order decision. Out of the 30 subjects, we find only 40% of the subjects employed the "win-stay" strategy and 0% used the "lose-shift" strategy with p < 0.05. This is not entirely surprising as studies have shown that probability matching behavior disappears in the presence of financial incentives (Vulkan 2000) .
Another common explanation for experimental newsvendor decisions is the "demand chasing heuristic" (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) . To evaluate the demand chasing effect in our data, we applied the technique used in Bolton and Katok (2008) , which measures the correlation between the current period's quantity and the previous period's demand, by subject. This method was recently highlighted as one of the best means for identifying demand chasing (Lau and Bearden 2013) . We find that 0% of our subjects had a correlation coefficient that is positive and significant at the p < 0.05 level. Thus, there is no support for demand chasing in our data.
Robustness Treatment
In an effort to see whether our results extend to a different set of parameters, we conducted an additional treatment that mirrored our first experiment from Study 1. Specifically, we used all of the same experimental protocols as before, except, in this new treatment, P (D = 100) = 0.30, and the cost per unit c = 3 such that the critical fractile is 0.25 (and n = 31). Our objective with this treatment was to confirm whether our earlier results, particularly that bounded rationality does not fully explain newsvendor decisions, are robust to different experimental parameters.
In Table 4 , we display the outcomes and predictions for this robustness treatment. Let us highlight a few observations. First, as shown in Table 4 , stocking q = 100 yields a fixed, positive payoff with certainty. Hence, stocking q = 400 is a riskier choice than stocking q = 100. Additionally, stocking q = 400 could potentially result in a loss (-800 when demand is 100). Thus, if subjects tend to set a quantity of 400 more frequently, contradicting the prediction of the bounded rationality model, they have to overcome both risk aversion and loss aversion. In the case of the lottery questions in this treatment, subjects had to choose between (A) a 100% chance of 100 profit, and (B) a 30% chance of -800 profit and a 70% chance of 400 profit. Again, these emulate the newsvendor outcomes and present them explicitly. Table 5 shows the probability that q = 100 was selected in the newsvendor rounds and lottery questions, where standard errors are calculated across subjects and presented in the brackets. We again see a newsvendor paradox. Between the first-round newsvendor data and the single-play lottery data, a one-sided proportions test reveals a significant difference (p = 0.009). Between the 30-round average newsvendor data and the repeated-play lottery data, a one-sided proportions test also reveals marginal significance (p = 0.090). This discrepancy further supports the theory that there exists a newsvendor specific bias compared to the the profit-based utility preferences. When we structurally fit the bounded rationality model to our data using the MLE method, we find the same results as in the original experimental treatment. In particular, the sign of the bounded rationality parameter is incorrect and significant (β = −262.1 p < 0.01) but positive for both lotteries (although not significant). With respect to subject-level behavior, 52% of subjects' choice probabilities do not conform to the bounded rationality model prediction, and 45% of subjects' choice probabilities reject the prediction based on a two-sided proportions test with a p < 0.05 level of significance. Again, we find little evidence of probability matching behavior as well (19% follow the "win-stay" strategy and 0% employ the "lose-shift" strategy). In addition, we find little support for demand chasing behavior in our data; there is only 3% of our subjects have a correlation coefficient that is positive and significant at with p < 0.05 (Lau and Bearden 2013) .
Discussion
From Study 1, we observe that, while there exist random errors in newsvendor decisions over time, the bounded rationality model alone cannot fully explain the newsvendor decision behavior.
Specifically, fitting our newsvendor decision data with the bounded rationality model, we obtain an incorrect sign for the bounded rationality measure β. On the other hand, the bounded rationality model can still explain people's decisions when the cue of newsvendor context is weakened (i.e., when the newsvendor problem is presented as an equivalent lottery choice problem). We note that this discrepancy extends the result reported by Kremer et al. (2010) . In their experiment, they find discrepancies between the lottery choice and newsvendor decisions under a uniform demand distribution. However, their newsvendor decision observations can still be fit by the bounded rationality model with a correct sign.
To better explain the newsvendor behavior in our experiment, we need to incorporate certain newsvendor context-specific biases into the original bounded rationality model. In our analysis, we tested both the win-stay-lose-shift strategy and the demand chasing heuristic; neither can explain the observed behavior. However, if we incorporate into the model a decision bias based on either mean anchoring or minimizing ex post inventory regret (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) , we can explain the observed decisions. To see this, in our first experiment in Study 1 the mean of demand was 190. Therefore, if a subject set a quantity of 100, it agrees with a mean anchoring bias (100 is closer to 190 than 400 is). 4 However, at the same time, a quantity of 100 will also minimize ex post inventory regret. Thus, if a subject has a strong decision bias for either mean anchoring or minimizing ex post inventory regret, then she will choose the quantity of 100 more often than 400, which agrees with our experimental observation. In fact, we can show that these two decision biases are mathematically equivalent under our two-choice model (see the Appendix). 4 In this treatment, the average order across all subjects is 232, falling between the mean 190 and the normative optimal decision 400. The average order appears to confirm the hypothesis that subjects tend to anchor on the mean and adjust (insufficiently) toward the optimal decision (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000) . In our experiment, however, there are only two decision choices: 100 and 400. If subjects were indeed adjusting toward the optimal decision, then the optimal quantity 400 should be chosen more often. But the contrary is observed in our experiment. Therefore, we believe that a more plausible mean anchoring explanation is to assume that subjects anchor on the mean and adjust toward the option with the smaller deviation from the mean (i.e., quantity 100 in this case).
To further tease out which decision bias model can better explain the newsvendor behavior, we introduce a third quantity decision option, representing the mean of demand, into our experiment in Study 2. With this additional choice option, the mean anchoring model and the ex post inventory model will yield different model predictions. It is important to note that these two competing theories yield the same pull-to-center prediction under a symmetric demand distribution, such as the uniform or normal distribution. As a result, in past newsvendor studies researchers have not been able to compare these two theories directly.
Study 2: Validating Models for Newsvendor Decision Biases
In this section, we present the results of our Study 2. In this study, we investigate whether including the mean anchoring or the ex post inventory regret bias into the bounded rationality model can explain the newsvendor decision behavior. We begin by presenting the theory for bounded rationality model with decision biases, followed by the details of the experimental design and results.
The Bounded Rationality Model with Decision Biases
Consider again a newsvendor problem for a single product with a two-point demand. In this case, we introduce an additional decision option at the mean of demand m = πd + (1 − π)d . Moreover, we extend the bounded rationality utility function (2) by including a newsvendor-specific decision bias for each option:
where g(·) is the psychological cost induced by the decision bias for each option, α (α > 0) is the relative weight of such a cost with respect to the expected profit and random errors. We note that ε i (i = 1, 2, 3) are independent standard Gumbel random variables as in (2).
Let
and
Given the above utility function, the choice probability for each option can be written as
e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β
e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β .
(5)
Mean Anchoring Bias
In the mean anchoring bias model, we use the following psychological cost function for each option:
where γ captures the potential overweighting (γ > 1) or underweighting (0 < γ < 1) of the upward deviation from the mean. When γ = 1, we have equal weight of the downward and upward deviations from the mean. From the above expression, it is clear that these cost functions capture people's tendency to anchor on the mean. We will test the model with γ values in the neighborhood of γ = 1, i.e., γ = 0.9, 1 and 1.1, representing underweighting, equal weighting, and overweighting of the upward deviation from the mean, respectively.
Ex Post Inventory Regret Bias
In the ex post inventory regret model, we assume the following psychological cost for each option:
where γ captures the potential overweighting (γ > 1) or underweighting (0 < γ < 1) of the regret of having leftover inventory. When γ = 1, we have equal weight of the regret of having either inventory stockout or leftover. In this particular case, we have b 1 = (1 − 2π)(1 − π)δ and b 2 = (1 − 2π)δ.
It follows that a 1 /b 1 = (p − c − pπ)/(1 − 2π) = a 2 /b 2 . Hence, when γ = 1, we cannot estimate α and β separately based on the choice probabilities specified in (5). Therefore, we will instead estimate the model with γ values in the neighborhood of γ = 1, i.e., γ = 0.9 and 1.1, representing underweighting and overweighting of leftover inventory, respectively.
It is worth noting two points here. First, our ex post inventory regret model resembles the reference dependence model proposed by (Ho et al. 2010 ) that captures the difference between the psychological costs of leftovers and stockouts. However, their model assumes the same linear cost function with two different weights, whereas here we assume two different cost functions with the same weight. 5 Second, if we assume that subjects choose an order quantity based on their demand forecast, then minimizing ex post inventory regret is the same as minimizing demand forecast errors. Interpreted in this way, our model above also captures the potential underweighting and overweighting of over-forecast with different γ values.
Experimental Design
We modified our experiment from Study 1 by adding a third quantity option representing the mean of demand, 190. We kept all experimental protocols and parameters the same as in Study 1, p = 4, c = 1, P (D = 100) = 0.70, 30 rounds, and included 30 new participants from the same subject pool during the fall of 2013. We also included one additional post treatment question, which asked for subjects to estimate the mean of the demand distribution, and compensated them $1.00 if they entered a value between 170 to 210. Table 6 illustrates the payoffs for each demand scenario and quantity decision, along with the the bias for each model outlined in §4.1. A few comments are in order. First, note that similar to Study 1, stocking 400 results in the highest expected profit. Therefore, stocking 400 suggests that people are making decisions in line with the bounded rationality model (or the normative benchmark if they make zero errors and stock 400 every round). Second, stocking the mean, 190, yields the smallest psychological cost of deviating from the mean. Lastly, stocking 100 yields the smallest psychological cost of the ex post inventory regret. As a result, each of the three quantity choices is roughly tied to one of the models outlined in §4.1 (and depending on the specific values of β and α). Figure 4 illustrates the probability of stocking 100, and the cumulative probability of stocking 100 and 190, over time. A Pearson's chi-squared test of independence reveals no significant effect of rounds (χ 2 (58) = 50.12, p = 0.760). Table 7 depicts the summary statistics from the newsvendor decisions and lottery decisions.
Results
As with Study 1, we observe a paradox. Comparing the first-round newsvendor data and the single-play lottery data for P (q = 100), a one-sided proportions test reveals a significant difference (p = 0.033). Between the 30-round average newsvendor data and the repeated-play lottery data for P (q = 100), a one-sided proportions test also reveals significance (p = 0.052). Although not depicted, the average estimate of the mean of demand among subjects was 180.4, which is not statistically different from the true mean of 190. 6 In order to directly compare the models outlined in §4.1, we turn to structural estimation.
From the choice probabilities of given in (5), we can derive the MLE estimates for the decision bias weight α and the bounded rationality measure β (see the Appendix for the detailed derivation). Table 8 shows the estimates for β for the bounded rationality model (without decision biases), and estimates of β and α for the mean anchoring model with γ = 0.9, 1, 1.1, and the ex post inventory regret model with γ = 0.9, 1.1. First, the bounded rationality model results in a worse fit compared to the other four estimations, evidenced by the lower log-likelihood and the incorrect sign of β, which suggests that there exist strong decision biases in the newsvendor data. Turning to the other models, the value of β is negative and significant for all estimations except the ex post inventory regret bias model with γ = 0.9. Therefore, in a direct comparison among these models, it appears that the ex post inventory regret bias model (with an underweighting of the leftover inventory) results in the best fit on aggregate. 7 Table 8 : Maximum-likelihood estimates of the bounded rationality, mean anchoring, and ex post inventory regret models for newsvendor decisions in Study 2.
Bounded
Mean Mean Mean Inventory Inventory rationality anchoring anchoring anchoring regret regret (γ = 0.9) (γ = 1) (γ = 1.1) (γ = 0.9) (γ = We further conducted an individual level analysis. Specifically, we put subjects into four categories based on their choice decisions: 1) weak or no decision bias if P (q = 400) ≥ 50%; 2) strong mean anchoring bias if P (q = 190) ≥ 50%; 3) strong ex post inventory regret bias if P (q = 100) ≥ 50%; and 4) other if all choice probabilities are less than 50%. We found that 50% of the subjects with strong ex post inventory regret bias, 20% with weak or no decision bias, another 20% with strong mean anchoring bias, and the final 10% belong to other. These individual level results indicate that, while all three decision behaviors hypothesized by the three respective theories (i.e., bounded rationality without biases, mean anchoring and minimizing ex post inventory regret) exist at the individual level, the bounded rationality model with an ex post inventory regret bias is flexible enough to explain at least 70% of subjects' behavior (50% with strong ex post inventory regret bias plus 20% with weak or no bias). As a result, at the aggregate level, this model yields the best fit under structural estimation.
Robustness Treatment
As with Study 1, we conducted a separate robustness treatment with c = 3 and P (D = 100) = 0.30, and added a third decision option for the mean of demand, 310. Table 9 reflects the payoffs for each demand outcome and quantity decision, along with the bias for each behavioral model. As with the robustness treatment from Study 1, note that subjects could incur losses if picking a quantity of 310 or 400, and that they coincide with riskier choices, compared to stocking 100. Table 9 : Experimental profits and decision biases in the robustness treatment for Study 2. for P (q = 100), a one-sided proportions test does not reveal a significant difference (p = 0.296), although this difference is marginally significant between 30-round average newsvendor data and the repeated-play lottery data (p = 0.081). Lastly, the average estimate of the mean of demand among subjects, after excluding four subjects who entered values less than 100, was 301, which is not statistically different from the true mean of 310. Table 11 shows the MLE results for the robustness treatment in Study 2. First, the sign of the bounded rationality model is actually correct for the newsvendor decisions, suggesting a possible weak effect of decision biases in this treatment. When looking at the remaining four estimations, as with the primary treatment in Study 2, only the ex post inventory regret model with γ = 0.9 has the correct signs for both β and α. Therefore, after conducting a likelihood-ratio test between the bounded rationality model (without decision bias) and the ex post inventory regret model, we find that the ex post inventory regret model with γ = 0.9 is significantly better after adjusting for the additional parameter (χ 2 (1) = 9.84, p < 0.01). This result is consistent with our finding in the primary treatment that the ex post inventory regret model (with an underweighting of the leftover inventory) results in the best fit on aggregate. Also, this result is quite strong when one considers that this robustness treatment provides a slight advantage to the bounded rationality model, as it is generally tied to a stocking quantity of 100, which is the only option that does not have any variability or potential for losses (i.e. behavior which matches the ex post inventory regret model in this robustness treatment requires one to overcome both risk and loss aversion).
As in the primary treatment, we further conducted an individual level analysis. We found in this treatment that 33% of the subjects with weak or no decision bias, 30% with strong ex post inventory regret bias, 20% with strong mean anchoring bias, and the final 17% belong to other. These individual level results again confirm that all three decision behaviors hypothesized by the three respective theories exist at the individual level. In this case, the bounded rationality model with an ex post inventory regret bias is again flexible enough to explain at least 63% of subjects' behavior. As a result, at the aggregate level, this model yields the best fit under structural estimation.
Discussion
From Study 2, we observe that, the bounded rationality model with a mean anchoring bias cannot account for the newsvendor decisions at the aggregate level, yielding incorrect signs for the MLE estimates. On the other hand, the bounded rationality model with an ex post inventory regret bias that underweights the leftover inventory can consistently account for the newsvendor decisions at the aggregate level for both the primary and robustness treatments. Our observation of underweighting of leftover in the ex post inventory regret model is also consistent with what has been observed in the previous studies by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) and Bolton and Katok (2008) .
Therefore, based on the results of our Studies 1 and 2, we are able to tease out the three plausible theories (i.e., bounded rationality without decision biases, mean anchoring, and minimizing ex post inventory regret) for the newsvendor decision behavior: While all three can explain newsvendor decisions under symmetric demand distributions, it appears that only the bounded rationality model with an ex post inventory regret bias is robust and flexible enough to account for newsvendor decisions under asymmetric demand distributions.
It is also interesting to note that the average order across all subjects in our primary treatment in Study 2 is 198, falling between the demand mean 190 and the optimal order quantity 400. Based on the average order, one may be tempted to hypothesize that subjects anchor on the mean 190 and make insufficient adjustment to the optimal decision 400. In our experiment, however, there are only three decision choices: 100, 190 and 400; and we observe subjects actually chose the quantity 100 more often than the combination of 190 and 400. Thus, by simply looking at the average order quantity, one may reach the incorrect conclusion that mean anchoring works well here.
We also find that all three decision behaviors exist at the individual level. Thus, the aggregate level model fit is essentially driven by the relative proportion of each decision behaviors at the individual level. These individual level results agree with informal conversations we had with participants after the treatments in Study 2. In general, a small portion of participants said that they preferred to focus on average demand (mean anchoring), while others said they felt more comfortable setting the quantity equal to the most likely demand outcome (minimizing ex post inventory regret).
Conclusion
In this paper we design a simple newsvendor experiment with an asymmetric demand distribution to validate three plausible theories for the newsvendor decision behavior. Our experimental results suggest that, besides random errors, there also exist newsvendor context-specific biases in people's decision behavior. More specifically, we find that the ex post inventory regret model can account for such decision biases quite well. It is also interesting to note that, if we assume subjects choose an order quantity based on their demand forecast, then minimizing ex post inventory regret is the same as minimizing demand forecast errors. From our post-experiment conversations with participants, it appears that subjects did try to minimize their demand forecast errors by setting the quantity equal to the most likely demand outcome.
Based on our experimental findings, one can design strategies to mitigate the decision bias in the newsvendor problem. For example, one could try to reframe the newsvendor problem to emphasize on the expected profit payoff structure, such as presenting the problem as a lottery choice problem, so as to eliminate the newsvendor context. Alternatively, one could try to weaken the salient cue for either inventory stockout or leftover (or demand forecast errors), such as giving delayed feedback of demand realizations (Lurie and Swaminathan 2009 ).
In summary, our experimental findings demonstrate that human decision makers are susceptible to the tendency of weighing too much on minimizing ex post inventory regret (or demand forecast errors), rather than choosing the rational decision to maximize the expected profit. From the supply chain point of view, our results suggest that random errors and decision biases in a downstream newsvendor's decisions may cause excessive order variability to the upstream party. In this sense, our experimental study provides an interesting behavioral cause for the widely-spread supply chain bullwhip effect, complementing the normative causes identified by Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997) and other behavioral causes identified by Croson and Donohue (2006) . function is given by L(α, β|k 1 , k 2 , n) = k 1 ln 1 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β + k 2 ln e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β +(n − k 1 − k 2 ) ln e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β = k 2 (a 1 + αb 1 ) β + (n − k 1 − k 2 )(a 2 + αb 2 ) β − n ln 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β .
By the first-order condition, we can obtain the MLE estimates of α and β by solving the following two equations simultaneously:
a 1 e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + a 2 e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β = a 1 k 2 + a 2 (n − k 1 − k 2 ) n ,
b 1 e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + b 2 e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β 1 + e (a 1 +αb 1 )/β + e (a 2 +αb 2 )/β =
From the MLE estimatesα andβ obtained from the above equations, let c 1 = (a 1 +αb 1 )/β and c 2 = (a 2 +αb 2 )/β. According to the second-order derivatives, we can obtain the standard error estimates forα andβ asσα where α ≥ 0 is the weight on the ex post inventory regret bias. It is clear that these two models are identical. Thus, one cannot distinguish these two decision biases under a two-choice model.
